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CHAD HA 
Abner J. Mikva * 
CHADHA. By Barbara Hinkson Craig. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1988. Pp. ix, 262. $24.95. 
There is a Dickensian quality to Barbara Craig's book on the 
Chadha case. (INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). At least three 
separate "plots" are interwoven in the book, and it makes for enjoya-
ble reading. 
First, there is the story line involving Jagdish Chadha. While 
other immigrants have found their way into the United States Reports 
(Yick Wo, Fong Yue Ting, Harisiades, Wong Wing), none has been 
given the star treatment that Craig gives Chadha. In many respects, 
Jagdish Chadha is the typical immigrant litigant trying to stay in this 
country. He came over on a student visa, considerably overstayed the 
term, was engaged to but never married an American citizen, was 
scheduled for deportation, and finally succeeded in persuading the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service to suspend the proposed depor-
tation. All this happened before the cosmic events that transformed 
Mr. Chadha's efforts from a run-of-the-mill immigration case to the 
Supreme Court landmark which struck down more acts of Congress 
than all the other Supreme Court cases combined. 
Chadha was a resident of Kenya, of Indian heritage; he chose not 
to seek Kenyan citizenship until shortly before he started his college 
education in the United States. He came to this country on a student 
visa, using a United Kingdom passport, and never left. After Kenya 
won independence, the U.K. was not very forthcoming about ac-
cepting East Asians who found Kenya inhospitable. On the other 
hand, Chadha made it very clear that the United States was his coun-
try of choice, since he did as little as possible to seek out any viable 
alternatives. Even his engagement to an American citizen looked a 
little suspect. Indeed, Chadha's is exactly the kind of situation Con-
gress was talking about when it expressed irritation with the Immigra-
tion Service for granting permanent residence to people who were 
evading the student restrictions Congress had imposed. 
Thus, Chadha's personal story intersects with the second story 
line: the tension between the American myth of a nation of immi-
grants, opening its doors wide to "your tired, your hungry, your 
poor," and the American reality of a nation whose domestic poverty 
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and endemic unemployment have forced tighter and tighter immigra-
tion policies. The Supreme Court, which Chadha hailed as his savior, 
had over the years fashioned a very amiable response to the initiatives 
of Congress and the executive branch to close our borders. During the 
McCarthy era the Court had given a virtual carte blanche to Congress 
to pass very tough exclusionary legislation. It had given the executive 
branch a broad discretion in enforcing those exclusions. 
As the son of immigrant parents, I sympathize with the concerns 
of Craig and Chadha. As a former elected official, however, I am 
much aware of the exclusionary instincts of our fellow citizens who 
are insecure financially or otherwise. I still remember the steel worker 
at one of my town meetings who asked me, with his accent intact, 
"Vot you going do about dem furriners coming in and taking away our 
chobs?" It is hard to talk to the hungry or the poor about other peo-
ple's hunger or poverty. It is hard to retain the image of the land of 
opportunity for all who want to come to our shores when the unem-
ployment rate for native-born black teenagers is almost forty percent. 
It is hard to convince trade unions to support liberalization of the im-
migration laws when they know that every immigrant poses a real and 
continuing threat to a unionized wage structure. 
Given this exclusionary milieu, it is very hard to paint a sympa-
thetic picture of a student who seeks permanent residency after over-
staying his visa, when he may be taking the place of some other more 
deserving immigrant who seeks the American dream. (Under the stat-
ute Chadha was invoking, the quota of immigrants allowed to enter 
the United States was reduced by the number of aliens whose deporta-
tion was suspended.) 
The third and most important story line is the "epic constitutional 
struggle" that Chadha waged to get permanent residency in America. 
It was a struggle that began when Congress overturned, by legislative 
veto, the administrative law judge's ruling recommending that 
Chadha's deportation be suspended and that he be allowed to remain 
permanently in this country. The legislative veto, was a safeguard 
Congress had inserted when it first authorized the I.N.S. to suspend 
deportation. Any suspension of a deportation had to be reported to 
Congress by the I.N.S., and Congress could "veto" the suspension by 
action of either the House or the Senate. This constituted the "one-
house veto" variation of the legislative veto device. Other variations 
allowed Congress to veto by action of both houses, by action of a com-
mittee of one house, or by the inaction of Congress for a certain period 
of time. All of these variations were found· unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in the Chadha case. 
Chadha challenged the veto in federal court. Then-Judge Anthony 
Kennedy, speaking on behalf of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
agreed with Chadha's contention that the legislative veto as applied in 
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Chadha's case violated the U.S. Constitution: "The Executive's deci-
sion ... was a reasoned one, rendered under the law. As such, it was 
an action that carried all the weight and dignity that necessarily at-
tends [such] deliberative decisions .... [T]he legislative action was 
both disruptive of and unnecessary to the sound administration of the 
law." 634 F.2d 408, 432 (9th Cir. 1980). 
The decision raised the ante and drew the lines far beyond the one-
dimensional "immigrant gets relief" case that Chadha's first lawyers 
had envisioned. Chadha's change in lawyers was 'symptomatic of the 
new ball game. He went from a brand new practitioner at the admin-
istrative level to the top of the experienced line in the Supreme Court. 
More important, both the executive branch and Congress thought this 
was a good time to get a definitive call on this power-sharing dispute. 
Craig gives the legislative veto a birth date of somewhere around 
1930 (p. 36). It waxed and waned in popularity over the years, but 
probably never had as wide a usage as it did in the 1970s. One of the 
reasons for its growth as a legislative tactic was the presence in Con-
gress of one Elliot Levitas, a Congressman from Georgia. Craig prop-
erly devotes a whole chapter to Levitas' impact on the battle. 
The growth of administrative government had led to a substantial 
change in the average citizen's view of his government and its agen-
cies. As recently as 1948, then Vice President Alban Barkley was able 
to arouse a roar of appreciation from the delegates to a Democratic 
Convention by defining a bureaucrat as "a Democrat that has a job 
that some Republican wants." But by the time Levitas came to Con-
gress in 1974, bureaucrats were considered much more dangerous. 
President Carter had campaigned against them in 1976. Ronald Rea-
gan would make an art form out of campaigning to "get the govern-
ment off our backs." The bureaucrats that Barkley had found so 
loveable had grown pointy heads and were ubiquitous. 
Levitas found it popular and exciting to use his forum in the Con-
gress to crusade against the excesses, real and fancied, of the adminis-
trative agencies. He started putting a legislative veto on everything he 
could get his hands on. Even though White House occupants had 
used the same line about administrative excesses to get to the White 
House, their answer was to restore power to the White House, not to 
Congress. And so the legislativy veto became the battle ground for 
these separate powers. To Chadha's good fortune (and to the ill for-
tune of the Congress and those who believe in the primacy of the first 
branch of government), it was the little legislative veto, which had 
been included in a 1952 immigration law, that became the epicenter of 
the struggle. 
The Supreme Court decision in Chadha is the reason for Craig's 
book. However, the decision itself merits less than ten pages in the 
book, including a big piece of the winning counsel's exultation about 
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having "hit the grand-slam home run" (p. 224). (I often wonder what 
the winning counsel said in Dred Scott or Marbury v. Madison, since 
baseball hadn't been invented yet.) Since the book is aimed at a wider 
audience than just lawyers and judges, and since there is a lot of text 
devoted to the real consequences of Chadha, it is just as well that 
Craig avoided the law review syndrome of describing the case by its 
metes and bounds. However, as I don't have that same self-discipline, 
I will spend my resources on the opinions. (Law-student readers 
should be advised that my analysis of the case is highly subjective and 
will not substitute for reading the opinions in full.) 
Craig describes an earlier effort to raise the legislative veto ques-
tion in an immigration case (pp. 27-31). That earlier case got as far as 
the briefing stage in the Court of Appeals before the I.N.S. made an 
offer to the immigrant that she couldn't refuse: the I.N.S. promised to 
get Congress to withdraw its veto so that the immigrant could get the 
permanent residency she was seeking. Just how the'I.N.S. was able to 
get Congress to withdraw was never determined, but obviously the 
government at that time was not particularly anxious to resolve the 
legislative veto issue. However, by the time Chadha arrived at the 
Supreme Court by way of certiorari twelve years later, it seemed that 
everybody wanted the question decided in the worst way. And that is 
exactly what happened. 
One does not have to be a bleeding-heart to have sympathy for 
Chadha's plight. Even though he had helped bring about his situation, 
he clearly was in a citizenship limbo. He could be expected to make a 
law-abiding and even desirable resident. More important, there is 
something very bizarre about the legislature reviewing a proceeding 
that looks exactly like a judicial proceeding - where testimony is 
takeµ, the decisionma)cer wears a black robe and is called "Judge," 
and the parties participate in an adversarial process. In the legislative 
forum, the decisionmakers were political actors, and the decision was 
made on the fly by members of Congress who knew nothing about Mr. 
Chadha's plight or the facts or the law. Indeed, there wasn't even a 
formal vote on Chadha - his deportation was to be reinstated by 
"unanimous consent," a procedure that is summary and undeliberate. 
Had the Supremt'. Court responded to any of these stimuli, there 
would not have been much stir about the Chadha case. 
Chief Justice Burger made Chadha a cause ce!ebre by taking the 
broadest road to decision. He struck down the very concept of the 
Congress' reviewing any actions taken by administrative agencies. He 
declared that the legislative veto blatantly sidestepped the constitu-
tional prqtections afforded the executive branch arid that Congress 
could act against an,. administrative decision only by passing a bill 
through both houses and ·presenting it to the President. Written in the 
lofty language of separation of powers, the majority opinion almost 
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makes one forget that th~ rights of an individual are involved. The 
facts revolve more around the causes of the American Revolution than 
around Jagdish Chadha. Bicameralism and presentment are the code 
words, not deportation and residency. 
To reach the merits, the normally restrained Chief Justice had to 
overcome several threshold questions. First of all, he had to find an 
aggrieved party. Mr Chadha had received all the relief that he had 
sought from the Court of Appeals. The I.N.S., part of an executive 
branch that didn't like the legislative veto in the Chadha case or any-
where else, also had no complaint about the Court of Appeals deci-
sion. It successfully had taken the position there, as it did in the 
Supreme Court, that the legislative veto was unconstitutional. So, 
where was the case or controversy that Article III requires? At least 
by the time the case got to the Supreme Court, all the parties below 
were very happy with the way things turned out. 
To surmount this seemingly insurmountable jurisdictional prob-
lem, the Chief Justice seized upon the Johnny-come-lately intervenors, 
the House and the ~enate, as the parties whose opposition to the Court 
of Appeals decisi9n provided an Article III controversy. The House 
and Senate were neither plaintiffs nor defendants; they had been in-
vited by the Ninth Circuit to be amid curiae, and then petitioned for 
status as intervenors after the Ninth Circuit decision. The Chief Jus-
tice buttressed this ground with another: any agency is aggrieved 
when any part of its substantive statute is declared unconstitutional, 
even when it agrees with the decision and had actively sought to se-
cure it. Not surprisingly, the Chief Justice essayed no opinion about 
how ardent such a contented agency would be as an adversary. 
Congress might be expected to be ardent, but not about whether 
Chadha was to be deported. Congress wanted a big win: the right to 
slice the powers that it delegated any way it saw fit. No one was left 
with any impetus to focus the case on the questions actually presented 
by the facts of the Chadha dispute. No one was left who would argue 
only about this kind of legislative veto, the case that was actually 
before the Court, and win or lose only that case. All the real players 
wanted to hit a home run. More important than any technical juris-
dictional quibbles, the Chief Justice, in order to reach the broad con-
stitutional question that the two political branches wanted resolved, 
gave the shortest of shrift to the core policy that only a real case or 
controversy may be decided by the federal courts. He reached. 
There were other thresholds - questions that in other cases had 
caused the Chief Justice great concern as to whether the Supreme 
Court was needlessly reaching out for controversies. Chadha had by 
this time married a different American citizen than the one he was 
engaged to earlier in the drama. As an "immediate relative" of the 
American citizen, Chadha became eligible for permanent residence 
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through other sections of the very statute in question. Congress had 
also passed the Refugee Act of 1980, ·which probably made Chadha 
eligible for asylum and permanent residence. But those possibilities, 
said the Chief Justice, were speculative, and did not preclude a deci-
sion on the merits. 
Still another hurdle existed. The questions that the Court was be-
ing asked to consider looked very much like the "political questions" 
that some members of the Court had previously found barriers to 
hearing cases. In this case the barriers were lifted. 
Other jurisdictional challenges were made. No matter. Citing no 
less an authority than Chief Justice Marshall, the Chief Justice re-
minded us that "[q]uestions may occur which we would gladly avoid; 
but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judg-
ment, and conscientiously to perform our duty." 462 U.S. at 944 
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (182i)). The 
march to the merits was inexorable. 
Justice Powell was wholeheartedly in favor of Chadha's cause. He 
just didn't see why the Court had to reach so far· to solve the problem. 
With the moderation that was his trademark, he cited Chief Justice 
Marshall in another case and context: "It is the peculiar province of 
the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; 
the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to 
be the duty of other departments." 462 U.S. at 967 (Powell, J., con-
curring) (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810)). 
That was the route Justice Powell wanted to follow: Chadha was enti-
tled to relief because Congress was pretending to judicial capacities by 
reviewing and overturning the administrative, quasi-judicial decision 
in Chadha's favor. The "conceptual" dispute about the existence of 
the legislative veto as a congressional device did not have to be ad-
dressed in Powell's view. ' 
Justice White was not as gentle. He dissented ·vigorously and said 
that the holding had a "destructive scope." 462 U.S. at 1002 (White, 
J., dissenting). The decision, he said; "reflects a profoundly different 
conception of the Constitution than that held by the courts which 
sanctioned the modem administrative state." 462'U.S. at ·1002. After 
pointing out that the Court's decision In Chadha struck down provi-
sions in more laws than the Court had invalidated in its entire history, 
he delivered the crushing blow to those Justices who insisted that 
others, not they, were activists: "I fear it will now be more difficult to 
'insur[ e] that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be 
made . . . by the body immediately responsible to the people.' " 462 
U.S. at 1002-03 (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part)). 
The Chadha decision was given the frilt'treatment by press and bar. 
Newspaper reporters and editorial writers, unsure of the long-range 
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significance of the holding, praised the Court for its courage. Since all 
of the official parties to the case were on the same side of the issue, the 
lawyers for the parties had a love-in with each other and with the 
Court. The only dissidence came from the Hill. Congress was un-
happy. Cruel fate had caused Congressman Levitas to lose his seat in 
the 1984 election, so he was not present for the entire aftermath. He 
was in Congress long enough, however, to tell his colleagues (and the 
Court) what he thought about Chief Justice Burger's handiwork: 
We find ourselves in a position where our system of government as it has 
evolved is involved in a train wreck .... We are going to have to be 
innovative and imaginative because in the last analysis Congress cannot 
lose in this struggle .... The Supreme Court's decision, however, is not 
the last word on this subject. [p. 233] 
The Congressman was certainly right about the last word. But not 
everyone, even in the Congress, agreed with his estimate of the degree 
of wreckage. 
Joseph Moakley, a senior Congressman from Massachusetts and 
chairman of the subcommittee of the Rules Committee that has juris-
diction over the legislative veto, thought the Court decision was in 
response to the excessive use of the legislative veto by the Congress. 
Since he had been one of Levitas' adversaries on this subject, his views 
were expected, but they still carried weight. They continue to have 
influence, since Moakley is still a member of the House. His subcom-
mittee has held extensive hearings about the problems caused by the 
Chadha decision, and about ways for Congress to be "innovative and 
imaginative." 
Some of the legislative solutions have· proved to be improvements 
on the legislative veto. On government salaries, for example, Congress 
has fashioned a procedure that calls for the President to make recom-
mendations to the Congress that will automatically go into effect in 
thirty days unless Congress passes a bill to the contrary within that 
period. Because there is a legislative enactment, presented to the Pres-
ident, the procedure passes Chadha muster. It nevertheless remains a 
way for Congress to keep its hand in a subject on which it has dele-
gated major power to the executive branch. Parts of the War Powers 
Act, requiring notice to the Congress of military expeditions by the 
President, follow this general pattern. (There are other parts of the 
law that would seem to run afoul of the mechanistic approach set forth 
in Chadha, but even former Chief Justice Burger would have difficulty 
finding parties with standing to bring such a dispute to resolution.) 
Maybe Chadha can be a "designated plaintiff" in all those suits where 
the separation of powers is involved, and he can be found to have 
standing under the tradition and precedent of Chadha. That would be 
a lot easier than trying to untangle all the precedents under which the 
Court imposed strict standards on the federal judiciary to see that a 
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truly aggrieved plaintiff is jousting with a real defendant in a real con-
troversy - and to reconcile those procedures with Chadha. 
Chief Justice Burger said that the Chadha case would have to be 
ranked as one of the fifty most important cases of all time (p. 232). 
That may be, simply because it affected so many laws and materially 
changed the way Congress does business. However, if the measuring-
stick is advancement of the political process, I'm not so sure. 
Whatever the ranking, if one wants to understand how the judicial 
process intersects with that political process, and how these landmark, 
home-run cases come to pass, Craig's book is a superb guide. 
